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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

v.

:

ROLANDO CARDONA-GUETON,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

Case No. 20110146-CA
Appellant is incarcerated.

:

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This is an appeal from a judgment of conviction for one count Possession With
Intent to Distribute a Controlled Substance, a first degree felony, see Utah Code Ann. §
58-37-8(l)(a)(iii) (2009), enhanced pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(4)(a)(v)
(2009) in the Third Judicial District, in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the
Honorable Judith Atherton, presiding. See Addendum A (Sentence, Judgment,
Commitment). This case was transferred from the Utah Supreme Court to this Court. This
Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(j) (Supp. 2009).
ISSUES, STANDARD OF REVIEW, AND PRESERVATION
Issue: Park enhancement: Did the State present sufficient evidence to prove that the
offense, which occurred on the sidewalk at the corner of 400 South and 300 West, was
committed in a "drug-free zone," defined by statute as "in a public park"?
Preservation/Standard of Review: This issue was preserved at R. 175:151-52. "When a
1
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jury verdict is challenged on the ground that the evidence is insufficient.. .we review the
evidence and all inferences which may reasonably be drawn from it in the light most
favorable to the verdict... .We reverse... only when the evidence, so viewed, is
sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have
entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime of which he was
convicted." State v. Hirschi, 2007 UT App 255,1j 15, 167 P.3d 503 (citations and internal
quotations omitted); State v. Waldron, 2002 UT App 175, ^ 2, 51 P.3d 21 (in reviewing
the sufficiency of the evidence to support a jury's verdict, this Court reviews "the record
facts in a light most favorable to the jury's verdict").
Issue: Knowledge and constructive possession of drugs: In arguing its theory of
constructive possession, did the State present evidence sufficient to prove (i)
"possession" where the evidence failed to establish a sufficient nexus between CardonaGueton and the drugs, and (ii) that he had the knowledge, ability, and intent to exercise
dominion and control over the drugs?
Preservation/Standard of Review: This issue was preserved at R. 175:151. When a jury
verdict is challenged on the ground that the evidence is insufficient, an appellate court
will consider the facts in a light most favorable to the verdict. State v. Layman, 1999 UT
79, Tf 12, 985 P.2d 911. "An appellate court should overturn a conviction for insufficient
evidence when it is apparent that there is not sufficient competent evidence as to each
element of the crime charged for the fact-finder to find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that
the defendant committed the crime." Id (citing State v. James, 819 P.2d 781, 784-85
(Utah 1991)). Reversal is required "when the evidence, so viewed, is sufficiently
2
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inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained a
reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime of which he was convicted."
State v. Hirschi, 2007 UT App 255, If 15, 167 P.3d 503 (citations and internal quotations
omitted); State v. Waldron, 2002 UT App 175, ^ 2, 51 P.3d 21 (in reviewing the
sufficiency of the evidence to support a jury's verdict, this Court reviews "the record
facts in a light most favorable to the jury's verdict").
STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
The following provisions are relevant to the issues on appeal. Their text is
provided in full in Addendum B.
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(l)(a)(iii) (LexisNexis Supp. 2009); and
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(4)(a)(v) (LexisNexis Supp. 2009).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The State filed an information on October 27, 2009, charging Rolando CardonaGueton with one count of Possession of a Controlled Substance with Intent to Distribute,
a second degree felony. R. 1-2. The State filed an amended information on May 7, 2010.
R. 58-59. Cardona-Gueton was charged in this final information with one count of
Possession of a Controlled Substance with Intent to Distribute in a Drug-Free Zone, a
first degree felony. Id. A copy of this final information is attached hereto as Addendum
C.
Voir dire commenced on September 7, 2010. R. 175:3. A one-day jury trial was
held on September 7, 2010. R. 175. The jury convicted Cardona-Gueton as charged. R.
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175:154-55. On January 14, 2011, the court sentenced Cardona-Gueton to an
indeterminate term of 5 years to life. R. 177:9.
Cardona-Gueton filed a timely notice for appeal. R. 163. This case was transferred
from the Utah Supreme Court to this Court. R. 169-72. This appeal follows.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Officers Observe Cardona-Gueton on the Corner of 400 South and 300 West.
On October 22, 2009, Officers Ammon Mauga, Mike Cardwell and Kristopher
Jeppsen observed Mr. Rolando Cardona-Gueton ("Cardona-Gueton") speaking to another
person near a bench on the comer of 400 South 300 West, Salt Lake City, Utah. R.
175:51, 79-80. According to Officer Mauga, Cardona-Gueton and the other individual
"look[ed] around" before approaching one another. R. 175:51-52. After the two men
approached each other, "they once again looked around [], and then they went separate
ways." R. 175:52. Although the officers never saw the two individuals speak or make any
physical contact, the officers suspected a drug transaction and approached CardonaGueton. R. 175:51-53,60.
As the officers approached, Cardona-Gueton sat down on a bench on the sidewalk
and began to smoke a cigarette. R. 175:52-53. Officer Cardwell believed that CardonaGueton was violating an outdoor smoking ordinance and began issuing a citation. R.
175:53, 64. While Officer Cardwell was writing the citation, Officer Mauga noticed a
bicycle leaning against the bench which appeared to be a "high quality" red bike that had
been spray-painted black. R. 175:53, 64, 81-82. Recalling a recent bulletin about a

4

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

missing red bike, Officer Mauga thought the fact that the bike was spray-painted signaled
that "it possibly could be stolen." IdL at 53.
Officer Mauga asked Cardona-Gueton if the bicycle was his. Id. Cardona-Gueton
responded "yeah." Id. Officer Jeppsen asked Cardona-Gueton if he "could look at [the
bike]" and Cardona-Gueton said yes. R. 175:81. The officers testified that they had seen
Cardona-Gueton multiple times before in the park, but that they had never seen him with
a bike. R. 175:66-67.
Officer Jeppsen "flipped" the bike "upside down so [he] could look at the serial
number." R. 175:54, 83-84. Once Officer Jeppsen turned the bike over, he discovered a
hidden compartment in between the fork of the handlebars. R. 175:54, 83-84. The officer
inquired about the compartment. Id. In response, Cardona-Gueton admitted to the officers
it wasn't actually his bike. R. 175:54. A search of the hidden compartment revealed
fourteen rocks of crack cocaine which was the basis of the arrest. R. 175:89. Upon a
search incident to arrest, officers recovered $166 in cash. R. 175:71, 75. No drugs or drug
paraphernalia were found on Cardona-Gueton. R. 175:111-12. The officers never verified
whether or not the bike was stolen. R. 137:70, 99.
Cardona-Gueton's Testimony.
Cardona-Gueton testified that he arrived by bus to the corner of 400 South 300
West, Salt Lake City, Utah on October 22, 2009. R. 175:120. When he arrived at that
location, he sat down on a bench on the sidewalk. R. 175:121. Near the bench was a
lamppost which had a bicycle leaning against it. Id. at 121. He began to read a letter and
smoke. Id. at 122-23. It was at this point he noticed police officers approaching him. Id.
5
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at 122-23. He testified that because he speaks Spanish, and the police officers were
talking to him in English, he did not understand what they were saying to him.1 R.
175:122-23. Cardona-Gueton denied that the drugs were his and denied knowing "that
there were drugs inside that bicycle." R. 175:123. He explained that the $166 was from a
check he cashed from Social Security's Supplemental Security Income program. R.
175:124.
Motion to Dismiss.
At the close of the State's case at trial, Cardona-Gueton moved for a directed
verdict on the application of the "drug-free zone" penalty enhancement, arguing that
there was insufficient evidence that the drug-related offense had been committed "in a
public park." R. 175:151-52. The trial court summarily denied the motion. R. 175:52. A
jury found Cardona-Gueton guilty of possession with intent to distribute a controlled
substance in a drug-free zone. Defendant subsequently filed a motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict and to arrest judgment, which the trial court denied. R. 130,
158-59.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The State failed to meet its burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that
Cardona-Gueton committed a drug-related offense "in a public park" as required by the
drug penalty enhancement statute. The State's evidence established only the address of
the offense. Officers Mauga and Jeppsen testified that the offense occurred at 400 South

1

The officers spoke to him in English and did not call for a Spanish-speaking officer. R.
175:64, 67-69. Cardona-Gueton used a Spanish interpreter at trial. R. 175:25-26.
6
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300 West in the "area" of Pioneer Park. The State is required to produce independent
evidence that an offense occurred as specifically outlawed by statute. The State failed to
do so. Moreover, it is unclear whether the jury was adequately instructed on its duty to
determine whether the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the offense occurred
in a public park.
The State also failed to present sufficient evidence to prove that Cardona-Gueton
'possessed' the crack cocaine. The State is required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt
that Cardona-Gueton had actual or constructive possession of the drugs. The State did not
produce any evidence of actual possession and failed to present sufficient evidence of
constructive possession. The State was unable to establish a 'sufficient nexus' between
Cardona-Gueton and the drugs. Therefore the evidence was sufficiently inconclusive to
permit an inference that the he had both the power and the intent to exercise dominion
and control over the drugs.
ARGUMENT
I.

MR. CARDONA-GUETON'S DRUG PENALTY ENHANCEMENT
CONVICTION SHOULD BE REVERESED BECAUSE THE STATE
DID NOT PRESENT SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO PROVE
BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT THAT THE OFFENSE
OCCURRED "IN A PUBLIC PARK."

The State failed to proffer evidence sufficient to show that the offense occurred
"in a public park." The evidence established that the offense was committed on a street
sidewalk "outside" of Pioneer Park. Where the marshaled evidence shows that CardonaGueton was not in a park, but on a street sidewalk, sitting on a bench located on a paved
pedestrian walkway facing away from the park, the evidence is legally and factually
7
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inconclusive to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the offense was committed in a
public park.
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(4) provides heightened sentences for certain drugrelated crimes committed in statutorily defined 'drug-free' locations. Utah Code Ann. §
58-37-8(4)(a)-(c). A drug-related offense committed "in a public park" is subject to
increased penalties. Id. 58-37-8(4)(a)(v) (enhancing a second-degree felony to a firstdegree felony). The penalty enhancement provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8
constitute elements "of the underlying offense[s] that must be proved beyond reasonable
doubt... to the trier of fact." State v. Davis, 2007 UT App 13, «f 10, 155 P.3d 909 (citing
State v. Powasnik, 918 P.2d 146 (Utah Ct. App. 1996)); see also United States v. Smith,
13 F.3d 380, 382 (10th Cir. 1993) (concluding that federal drug-free zone enhancement
statute "constitutes an 'offense5 which has an element of proof that the distribution
occurred within 1,000 feet of a protected place"); State v. South, 932 P.2d 622, 626-27
(Utah 1997) (distance element of statute providing heightened sentence for drug-related
crimes committed within 1000 feet of a church was element of underlying drug offenses
that the State was required to prove beyond reasonable doubt). Therefore, the State must
present sufficient evidence that the crime was committed inside a public park. Here the
State failed to provide sufficient evidence to show that the location of the offense —a
sidewalk at the corner of 400 South and 300 West— was subject to the drug-free zone
penalty enhancement.
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8

a. "In a Public Park" Defined
Because Cardona-Gueton was charged with, convicted of, and sentenced pursuant
to the "park" enhancement provision, it is necessary to determine what constitutes a
"public park." The Utah Controlled Substances Act, codified in Utah Code Ann. § 58-378(4)(a) (the "Act"), provides in relevant part:
(a) Notwithstanding other provisions of this section, a person not authorized under
this chapter who commits any act declared to be unlawful under this section ... is
upon conviction subject to the penalties and classifications under this
Subsection (4) if the trier of fact finds the act is committed:
(i) in a public or private elementary or secondary school or on the grounds
of any of those schools;
(ii) in a public or private vocational school or postsecondary institution or
on the grounds of any of those schools or institutions;
(iii) in those portions of any building, park, stadium, or other structure or
grounds which are, at the time of the act, being used for an activity
sponsored by or through a school or institution under Subsections (4)(a)(i)
and (ii);
(iv) in or on the grounds of a preschool or child-care facility;
(v) in a public park, amusement park, arcade, or recreation center;
(vi) in or on the grounds of a house of worship [];
(vii) in a shopping mall, sports facility, stadium, arena, theater, movie
house, playhouse, or parking lot or structure adjacent thereto;
(viii) in or on the grounds of a library;
(ix) within any area that is within 1,000 feet of any structure, facility, or
grounds included in Subsections (4)(a)(i), (ii), (iv), (vi), and (vii);
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(4)(a) (emphasis added).
The Act does not define "public park." However, the Merriam-Webster Online
Dictionary states that "park" comes from Old French "pari? meaning enclosure. As a
noun "park" has a number of definitions, the most common of which include:
1 a: an enclosed piece of ground stocked with game and held by royal prescription
9
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or grant b: a tract of land that often includes lawns, woodland, and pasture
attached to a country house and is used as a game preserve and for recreation 2 a:
a piece of ground in or near a city or town kept for ornament and recreation b: an
area maintained in its natural state as a public property.
See Park, Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, http://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/park?show=0&t=l 311873682 (last visited July 28, 2011); see
also Park, Online Etymology Dictionary,
http://www.etymonline.com/index.php?term=:park (last visited July 28, 2011); Park,
Dictionary.com, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/park (last visited July 28, 2011).
Utah modeled its drug penalty enhancement statute after the Federal Controlled
Substances Penalties Amendments Act of 1984. See Tape of House Floor Debates, 44th
Legislature, General Session (Feb. 12, 1986) (Statement of Rep. Moss); see also
Powasnik, 918 P.2d at 149; State v. Vigh, 871 P.2d 1030, 1035 (Utah Ct. App. 1994);
State v. Stromberg, 783 P.2d 54, 59 n.3 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). While the Utah Act
classifies the inside of "public parks" as drug-free zones, the comparable provision in the
federal act classifies "playgrounds" as drug-free zones and goes on to define that term as:
any outdoor facility (including any parking lot appurtenant thereto) intended for
recreation, open to the public, and with any portion thereof containing three or
more separate apparatus intended for the recreation of children including, but not
limited to, sliding boards, swingsets, and teeterboards.
21 U.S.C. § 860(e).
The common usage and meaning of "public park" does not include paved
walkways created for pedestrian use on the outer perimeter of a city block. These are

10
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sidewalks.2 Sidewalks are not parks "intended for the recreation of children" and they are
not enclosed grounds "kept for ornament and recreation."
Other provisions found in the Utah Code specifically distinguish a public "park"
from a "sidewalk" and treat each independently. For example, Utah Code Ann. § 76-9902(5)(a) defines a "public place" as "any location or structure to which the public or a
substantial group of the public has access, and includes:
(i) a sidewalk, street, or highway;
(ii) a public park, public recreation facility, or any other area open to the public...
See Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-902 (emphasis added). In other sections of the Utah Code,
the legislature also distinguishes a sidewalk from a park:
A municipal legislative body may lay out, establish, open, alter, widen, narrow,
extend, grade, pave, or otherwise improve streets, alleys, avenues, boulevards,
sidewalks, parks, airports, parking lots, or other facilities for the parking of
vehicles off streets, public grounds, and pedestrian malls and may vacate the same
or parts thereof, as provided in this title.
See Utah Code Ann. § 10-8-8 (emphasis added).3 Additionally, the Salt Lake City Code
states that a "street" "means and includes alleys, lanes, courts, boulevards, public ways,
public squares, public places and sidewalks." See Salt Lake City Code § 1.04.010.

"Sidewalk" is defined as "a usually paved walk for pedestrians at the side of a street."
See Sidewalk, Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, http://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/sidewalk (last visited July 26, 2011).
3
Other jurisdictions have similar statutes that differentiate a park from a sidewalk. See,
e.g., Ark. Code. Ann. § 14-54-105 (West 2011) (cities can alter or change the width or
extension of streets, sidewalks, alleys, avenues, parks, wharves, and other public
grounds).
11
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In this case, Cardona-Gueton was sitting on a bench4 located on a street sidewalk.
Officer Jeppsen testified that the location of the offense occurred in the "area" of Pioneer
Park. R. 175:80; see also Addendum C (the affidavit of probable cause states that "while
on routine bike patrol in the area of 400 South 300 West..." (emphasis added)). He later
testified that the outside corner of 400 South 300 West was "in the park." R 175:98 (on
cross examination, defense counsel asked him if the incident took place on the outside
corner of 400 South 300 West and he responded "[y]eah, it's in the park.").
Contrary to Officer Jeppsen's later assertion, see id-, Pioneer Park is distinctly
separate from the sidewalk where Cardona-Gueton was arrested. Pioneer Park is enclosed
by a paved walkway and is additionally surrounded by a gravel path. Both the paved
walkway and the gravel path separate the enclosed park from the sidewalk where
Cardona-Gueton was located.
Next, for the park enhancement to apply, the crime must be committed "in a public
park" rather than next to or even nearby a public park. See Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-

Counsel and witnesses referred to the location where Cardona-Gueton was sitting as
both a 'bench' and a 'park bench.' Compare R. 175:53 (Officer Mauga testified that
"[t]he defendant was sitting on the bench and the bike was just right next to him leaning
on the bench."), and R. 175:64 (the State asks Officer Mauga "[n]ow when you came to
the corner of 4th and 3 rd , Rolando was sitting on the bench?"), with R. 175:61 (the State
asks Officer Mauga "[f]rom the park bench, where exactly did they - were they standing
together when you saw them?" Officer Mauga responds "I'd say about five feet from the
park bench."). In sum, the terms 'bench' and 'park bench' were used interchangeably at
trial. Additionally, although a "park bench" can denote a bench that is located near a
park, the common understanding of a "park bench" refers more generally to a type of
bench. For example, a search of "park bench" in amazon.com results in multiple optionsfor-purchase of a distinct type of bench which can be used in a home or a garden. See
Park Bench, amazon.com, http://www.amazon.com/s/ref:=nb_sb_noss?url::=searchalias%3Daps&field-keywords=park+bench (last visited July 26, 2011).
12
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8(4)(a)(v) (emphasis added). T he sidewalk at which Cardona-Gueton was located is not
a "public park" and is not "in" Pioneer Park. The statute defines certain drug-free zones
as extending to "any area that is within 1,000 feet of any structure, facility, or grounds,"
of certain narrowly defined locations. However, the extended area only applies to
"Subsection 4(a)(i), (ii), (iv), (vi), and (vii)," and not Subsection 4(a)(v) -the "park"
provision. Therefore, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the crime was
committed in a park.
If the legislature intended to create 'drug-free' locations on street sidewalks, or
sidewalks near "any area that is within 1,000 feet" of a public park, it would have used
language to provide for that. Instead, the legislature specifically chose to create drug-free
zones within public parks, not "in and/or around" public parks. "Where statutory
language is plain and unambiguous, this Court will not look beyond to divine legislative
intent." State v. Smith, 2005 UT 57, ^ 11, 122 P.3d 615 (citations omitted); State v.
McCovey, 803 P.2d 1234, 1240 (Utah 1990) (Durham, J., dissenting) ("[T]he court has
no power to rewrite a statute to make it conform to an intention not expressed.").
b. The Evidence was Insufficient to Establish the Offense was Committed
"in a public park"
The evidence was insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a drugrelated offense was committed "in a public park." The marshaled evidence establishes
that Cardona-Gueton was on a street sidewalk at the corner of 400 South and 300 West
near Pioneer Park.
In determining whether there was sufficient evidence to convict a defendant,
13
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appellate courts do not examine whether the evidence at trial established guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt. State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74,118, 10 P.3d 346. Rather, courts look at
whether, after viewing all the evidence and all inferences drawn therefrom in a light most
favorable to the jury's verdict, the evidence was "sufficiently inconclusive or inherently
improbable such that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the
defendant committed the crime for which he or she was convicted.5' Id. ^f 18 (quoting
State v. Dunn, 850P.2d 1201, 1212 (Utah 1993)).
To convict Cardona-Gueton under the drug penalty enhancement provision, there
had to be sufficient evidence, including the logical and reasonable inferences that could
be drawn therefrom, that Cardona-Gueton committed a drug-related offense "in a public
park." The following evidence was before the court:
1. Cardona-Gueton was sitting at a bench on the street corner of 400 South and
300 West. R. 175:62, 64. Pioneer Park is in the "area" of 400 South and 300
West. R. 175:80; see also Addendum C (the affidavit of probable cause states
that "while on routine bike patrol in the area of 400 South 300 West...").
2. The bicycle containing the drugs was leaning against a bench (R. 175:53) or a
street lamppost (R. 175:121) on the sidewalk at the intersection of 400 South
and 300 West.
3. Pioneer Park has a reputation as a high drug sales area. R. 175:80.
4. The bench was facing away from Pioneer Park, toward the road. See State's
Exs. 1 & 2.
5. Officer Jeppsen testified that the outside corner of 400 South and 300 West
was in the park. R. 175:98.
6. Officers approached Cardona-Gueton to issue a citation for "smoking in the
park." R. 175:53, 80.

14
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7. Cardona-Gueton was never officially cited for smoking in a public park. R.
175:53,81-82.
Here, after marshaling the evidence and drawing inferences in the light most
favorable to the jury's verdict, it can only be said that the crime occurred on a bench on
the street corner outside of Pioneer Park. State's Exhibits Numbers 1 and 2 clearly show
that the bench was on the sidewalk, facing away from the park, toward the roadway. Both
officers testified that the defendant and the bicycle were located on the corner of 400
South and 300 West. The State presented no witnesses from the City with actual
knowledge of whether the sidewalk was part of the park. The State's witnesses merely
testified as to the address, that it was on the comer, and that Pioneer Park was located "in
that area." R. 175:80.
Although it is clear from the testimony that the officers treated the corner as if it
were inside the park boundaries, neither were qualified to testify as to the park's actual
boundary line, and neither were specifically asked whether the bench was inside the park.
The only witness the State directly questioned as to whether the bench was inside the
park boundary was Cardona-Gueton—who testified that he did not know. R. 175:124.
Because the State's witnesses only generally referred to the area as Pioneer Park, but did
not specifically testify that the corner was "inside the park" or that the sidewalk was
classified as a "public park," the evidence is sufficiently inconclusive and the
enhancement should be struck from the jury's verdict.5

5

The issue is further complicated by the fact that the jury was not specifically instructed
to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the offense occurred in a public park. The jury was
instructed:
15
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Before you can convict, ROLANDO CARDONA-GUETON of the offense of
Possession of a Controlled Substance with Intent to Distribute, a First Degree
Felony, you must find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, each and
every one of the following elements:
1. That on or about October 22, 2009, in Salt Lake County, State of
Utah, the defendant, ROLANDO CARDONA-GUETON;
2. Did knowingly and intentionally possess Cocaine;
3. That Cocaine was then and there a controlled substance; and
4. That at the time of said possession, the defendant intended to
distribute the substance.
See Jury Instr. # 12 at R. 115 (emphasis added).
The Jury was then provided a Special Verdict form which provided that if the jury
found Cardona-Gueton "guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of Possession of a Controlled
Substance with Intent to Distribute" that they were to then answer the following question:
We, the jury, having found the defendant, Rolando Cardona-Gueton, guilty of
Possession of a Controlled Substance with Intent to Distribute []
_do
do not
find from all the evidence and beyond a reasonable doubt that in
committing the offense of Possession of a Controlled Substance with Intent to
Distribute, the defendant, Roland Cardona-Gueton, committed the offense in a
public park, amusement park, arcade, or recreation center.
See Special Verdict at R. 129. The jury provided an "X" adjacent to the "do" option.
The use of "[s]pecial verdicts are generally disfavored in criminal trials" because
they interfere with the fact-finding province of the jury, and with the due process rights of
criminal defendants. See United States v. Spock, 416 F.2d 165, 182 (1st Cir. 1969)
(expressing disfavor with special verdicts because they interfere with the "constitutional
guarantees of due process and trial by jury [which] require that a criminal defendant be
afforded the full protection of a jury unfettered, directly or indirectly"); Tillman v. Cook,
25 F.Supp.2d 1245, 1288 (D. Utah 1998) (discussing general disfavor of special verdicts
in criminal cases); see also Kate H. Nepveu, Beyond "Guilty" or "Not Guilty": Giving
Special Verdicts in Criminal Jury Trials, 21 Yale L. & PoPy Rev. 263, 283 (2003)
(discussing general disfavor of special verdicts and discounting analogies that equate
special verdicts to jury instructions; finding that, although "[t]he information received
from the jury may make special verdicts desirable, [] it is not considered injury
instruction precedents" and only instructs juries in "how to fill out the form").
16
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Because the evidence presented at trial was "sufficiently inconclusive" as to
whether the offense occurred "in a public park" and because it is unclear whether the jury
understood its role in determining whether the offense was committed "in a public park,"
this Court should reverse and remand for a new trial, or, alternatively, the enhancement
should be struck from the jury's verdict, effectively reducing the conviction from a first
degree to a second degree.
II.

MR. CARDONA-GUETON'S CONVICTION REQUIRES
REVERSAL BECAUSE THE STATE FAILED TO PRESENT
SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO PROVE BEYOND A REASONABLE
DOUBT HE HAD ACTUAL OR CONSTRUCTIVE POSSESSION OF
THE DRUGS.

The evidence was insufficient to prove that Cardona-Gueton was guilty of
possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute. The State failed to establish
a sufficient nexus between Cardona-Gueton and the drugs to establish constructive
possession. The ownership of the bicycle was in dispute, the bicycle appeared to have
Although the jury concluded that Cardona-Gueton committed the offense "in a
public park, amusement park, arcade, or recreation center," the jury was not instructed on
this finding. The finding was only noted on the Special Verdict form. No instruction was
provided to the jury regarding its duty to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the offense
was committed in a public park and no instruction was given as to what qualifies as being
"in a public park." Hence, although the Special Verdict form indicates that the jury found
beyond a reasonable doubt that the offense was committed in a public park, the jury was
never instructed that this was an element and was never provided a definition of "in a
public park."
Moreover, jury instruction #12 inaccurately stated the law. Instruction #12
provided that Cardona-Gueton would be convicted of a first degree felony if the four
elements were proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Standing alone, the instruction was a
misstatement of the law. Cardona-Gueton could only be found guilty of a second degree
felony based on the jury finding the four elements proved beyond a reasonable doubt. For
Cardona-Gueton to be found guilty of a first degree felony, the jury needed also to find
that he committed the offense in a protected, 'drug-free' location.
17

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

been stolen, the hidden compartment containing the drugs was not visible without turning
the bicycle upside down for a close inspection, and the State offered no direct evidence
that Cardona-Gueton had knowledge of the drugs beyond what was inferred by his
contradictory claims as to the ownership of the bicycle. Therefore, the evidence is
sufficiently inconclusive such that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable
doubt that Cardona-Gueton had the knowledge, ability, and intent to exercise dominion
and control over the crack cocaine.
In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, appellate courts view the evidence in
the light most favorable to the jury's verdict and will reverse the jury's decision "only if
[it is] determine[d] that reasonable minds could not have reached the verdict." See State
v. Workman, 2005 UT 66, ^ 29, 122 P.3d 639 (internal quotation marks omitted); see
also Holgate, 2000 UT 74, f 18 (if the evidence is "sufficiently inconclusive or inherently
improbable such that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the
defendant committed the crime for which he or she was convicted" then reversal is
required). Conviction of possession with intent to distribute requires proof of two
elements: "(1) that defendant knowingly and intentionally possessed a controlled
substance, and (2) that defendant intended to distribute the controlled substance to
another." State v. Fox, 709 P.2d 316, 318 (Utah 1985); see also Utah Code Ann. § 58-378. Possession of a controlled substance sufficient to sustain a conviction need not be
actual. A conviction may also be based on constructive possession. State v. Martin, 2011
UT App 112,12, 251 P.3d 860 (citing Fox, 709 P.2d at 318-19).
To prove constructive possession, "it is necessary to prove that there was a
18
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sufficient nexus between the accused and the drug to permit an inference that the accused
had both the power and the intent to exercise dominion and control over the drug." Id. ^
2. In cases where the State relies on a theory of constructive possession, the State's
"burden entails a presentation of extensive and detailed facts" and "lack of such evidence
may well make it impossible for the State to fulfill its duty to establish-beyond a
reasonable doubt-the necessary nexus between a defendant and the [drugs]; any
significant deficiency in evidence establishing the nexus almost always leaves room for []
reasonable doubt as to the defendant's guilt." State v. Layman, 953 P.2d 782, 79192 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (citations and internal quotations omitted).
The sufficiency of the nexus depends upon the facts and circumstances of the
particular case. Martin, 2011 UT App 112, ^} 2. Courts look at various factors which may
indicate constructive possession, including, but not limited to:
(1)
(2)

(3)
(4)
(5)

Ownership and/or occupancy (State v. Salas, 820 P.2d 1386, 1388 (Utah Ct.
App. 1991));
The defendant's presence at the time the drugs were found, with emphasis
on the fact that the drugs were in plain or open view (Layman, 953 P.2d at
788);
Evidence indicating that the "defendant was participating with others in the
mutual use and enjoyment of the contraband" (Id.);
Presence of drug paraphernalia among the defendant's personal effects
(Fox, 709 P.2d at 320); and
Incriminating statements or behavior (Martin, 2011 UT App 112, *[j 3)
(finding constructive possession of drugs which were found in back seat of
patrol car where defendant had been "moving around suspiciously.. .leaning
forward and fidgeting around"); State v. Layman, 1999 UT 79, 985 P.2d
911 (instructing appellate courts to be mindful that factors indicating
constructive possession are not exhaustive, and should be used only as
"relevant considerations in making the underlying determination").

19
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Another factor which may indicate constructive possession is whether the drugs
were present "in a specific area over which the accused had control." See Martin, 2011
UT App 112,13. For example, in Martin, the court found a sufficient nexus where the
accused was the only person to occupy the back seat of the patrol car where drugs were
found and where the drugs were located in the exact same area where the accused's hands
had been. Id.
However, evidence of any of the above-listed indicators is not by itself
determinative of constructive possession, and must "be considered within the totality of
the circumstances presented." Layman, 953 P.2d at 788-89. For example, while
ownership and occupancy is a factor to consider, "[a] sufficient nexus is not established
by mere ownership and/or occupancy of the premises upon which the drugs [were] found
... especially when occupancy is not exclusive." Salas, 820 P.2d at 1388 (citations
omitted) (emphasis added) ("In order to find that the accused was in possession of drugs
found in an automobile he was not the sole occupant of, and did not have sole access to,
there must be other evidence to buttress such an inference.").
Similarly, even in cases where the accused exhibited incriminating behavior, if the
evidence was "inconclusive" as to whether "the drugs were subject to the defendant's
dominion and control" and as to whether "the defendant had the intent to exercise that
control," no sufficient nexus exists. See Layman, 1999 UT 79, ^ 16. For example, in
Layman, the accused and his passenger were in transit, selling drugs. Layman, 953 P.2d
782, 793 (Utah Ct. App. 1998), cert, granted. State v. Layman, 982 P.2d 87 (Utah Aug.
11, 1998), affd. State v. Layman, 1999 UT 79, 985 P.2d 911. The accused was pulled
20
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over and the police officer asked the passenger if he could search the pouch in her
waistband. Id. The officer testified that the passenger looked nervously at the accused for
guidance and the accused engaged in incriminating behavior by "shaking his head in a
negative fashion back and forth [] thus demonstrating that he had some control over the
drugs." Id Nonetheless, because it was inconclusive that the accused "had the knowledge,
ability, and intent to exercise dominion and control over the contraband" the court
concluded the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction. Id at 789 (emphasis
added).
Even in situations where the State can show that an accused knew of the existence
of contraband and its potential for illegal use, that does not amount to possession unless
the State can also establish the accused's personal intent to make use of that knowledge.
Spanish Fork City v. Bryan, 975 P.2d 501, 503 (Utah Ct. App. 1999). In Bryan, police
executed a search warrant on the defendant's home and discovered paraphernalia in plain
view within the home. Id. at 502. The court noted that although the defendant "most
certainly knew . . . of the items .. . knowledge and ability to possess do not equal
possession where there is no evidence of intent to make use of that knowledge." Id. at 503
(internal citations omitted). The State's evidence "must raise a reasonable inference that
defendant was engaged in a criminal enterprise and not simply a bystander." Id (quoting
Fox, 709 P.2d at 319-20). In short, "to show constructive possession, the State must prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that the drugs were subject to the defendant's dominion and
control and the defendant had the intent to exercise that control." Layman, 1999 UT 79, ^
16 (citing Fox, 709 P.2d at 318).
21
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To convict Cardona-Gueton, there had to be sufficient evidence, including the
logical and reasonable inferences that could be drawn therefrom, that there was a
sufficient nexus between Cardona-Gueton and the drugs to establish "possession." The
following evidence was before the court:
1. The crack cocaine was found in a hidden compartment within the frame of a
bicycle. R. 175:92-93.
2. The bicycle containing the drugs was leaning against a bench (R. 175:53) or a
street lamppost (R. 175:121) on the sidewalk at the intersection of 400 South
and 300 West. R. 175:53,64.
3. Officer Mauga had seen Cardona-Gueton on prior occasions, but never with a
bicycle. R. 175:66.
4. Both testifying officers expressed belief that the bike was probably stolen. R.
175:53-54, 81. It was never confirmed whether the bicycle was in fact stolen.
R. 175:94,99.
5. Cardona-Gueton initially claimed the bicycle was his. R. 175:53, 81. He
consented to a search of the bike. R. 175:8. He later denied that the bicycle was
his when the officer flipped the bicycle upside down and revealed a hidden
compartment. R. 175:54.
6. Both officers testified that earlier in the day they had seen Cardona-Gueton
"grab[] a bottle off of the bike" and drink from it. R. 175:54, 65, 83-84.
7. Although "nobody else was" around Cardona-Gueton during the arrest, the
incident occurred during rush hour traffic. R. 175:71, 95-96.
8. Cardona-Gueton had no credit cards or checks, but did have $166 of cash on
his person. R. 175:70-71, 75, 91. The officers did not find any drugs or
paraphernalia on Cardona-Gueton. R. 175:70-71, 75.
9. The hearsay allegations of prior drug dealing by Cardona-Gueton were
investigated and dispelled. R. 175:71-73 (Officer Mauga testified that he had
spoken with Cardona-Gueton on previous occasions because there had been
"calls of him selling drugs to passerbys").
10. Cardona-Gueton made no incriminating statements related to the drugs. R.
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175:107.
11. As acknowledged by Officer Jeppsen, Cardona-Gueton did not engage in
incriminating behavior sufficient to establish reasonable suspicion. R. 175:107.
12. Cardona-Gueton arrived at the corner of 400 South 300 West by bus. R.
175:120.
13. The suspicious "cork" blocking the hidden compartment was not visible until
the bike was turned upside down. R. 175:58-59.
14. Officers never saw Cardona-Gueton touch the bike, nor were prints taken from
the bike or the drugs. R. 175:68.
Here, there was no evidence showing that Cardona-Gueton had actual possession
of the crack cocaine: therefore, the only basis for conviction would have been that
Cardona-Gueton was in constructive possession of the crack cocaine. Drawing inferences
in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict, the marshaled evidence fails to establish a
sufficient nexus between Cardona-Gueton and the drugs and, thus, is insufficient to
support a finding of constructive "possession" such that "the drugs were subject to
[Cardona-Gueton's] dominion and control and [that he] had the intent to exercise that
control." Layman, 1999 UT 79, U 16.
With regard to ownership and/or occupancy of the bike, the State's witnesses
highlight the inconclusive nature of the evidence. The evidence demonstrates that
although Cardona-Gueton initially claimed the bike was his, true ownership of the bicycle
was never established. The officers testified that they believed Cardona-Gueton had stolen
the bicycle. In fact, the initial search of the bicycle was based on the very nature of the
officer's belief that the bicycle appeared stolen. Officer Mauga also testified that CardonaGueton had never been observed with this or any other bicycle previously.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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When the hidden compartment was discovered, Cardona-Gueton disclaimed
ownership. The State then switched gears and attempted to bolster the inference that
Cardona-Gueton actually did own the bike. The State presented evidence that earlier in the
day officers had seen him drink from a water bottle attached to the bike. However, this
fact was not noted in either of the police officers' reports, was not presented at preliminary
hearings, and was denied by Cardona-Gueton. R. 175:65-66, 98, 123. Looking at the
totality of the circumstances, the State's evidence regarding ownership/occupancy tends to
support Cardona-Gueton's testimony that he discovered the bicycle when he arrived by
bus earlier in the day. R. 175:120-21.
Next, although Cardona-Gueton was present when the drugs were found, the drugs
"were [not] in plain or open view" and in fact could not be seen without flipping the
bicycle upside down and engaging in a close inspection of the hidden compartment.
Nothing in the facts supports a reasonable inference that Cardona-Gueton had possession
of the bicycle long enough to have control of the bike necessary to have stashed the drugs,
examined the bike, or discovered the hidden compartment. Unlike the accused in Martin,
there was no evidence that Cardona-Gueton was the only person to "occupy" the bicycle,
and there was no evidence presented that Cardona-Gueton's hands had been near the
bicycle, let alone near the hidden compartment where the drugs were found. See R. 175:67
(Officer Mauga testified that at no time did he see Cardona-Gueton touch the bike).
The strongest circumstantial indicator of constructive possession is CardonaGueton's potentially incriminating behavior wherein he changed his story about the
ownership of the bike once the officer flipped over the bicycle and revealed the hidden
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compartment.6 This is not enough to establish constructive possession. The fact that
Cardona-Gueton consented to a search of the bicycle suggests that he had no idea the
bicycle had a hidden compartment containing drugs. R. 175:81 (Cardona-Gueton consents
to Officer Jeppsen's search of the bicycle); see also R. 48-54 (trial court's Ruling on
Motion to Suppress; finding that Cardona-Gueton consented to the search). Moreover,
there was no evidence establishing that Cardona-Gueton knew of the compartment until
the officers flipped the bike over. Because he made no incriminating statements related to
the drugs eventually found in the compartment, there is also no evidence that CardonaGueton had knowledge about what was in the compartment.
Similar to the accused in Layman —where the defendant signaled to his passenger
to not let the officer search her pouch and where the court found there was no evidence
that the accused had knowledge of what was in the pouch— here, there is no evidence that
Cardona-Gueton knew what was in the hidden compartment. It is entirely reasonable that,
like the accused in Layman, Cardona-Gueton realized that there was some type of
contraband in the enclosed, hidden compartment and wanted to admit that he did not
actually own the bike.
The Court has said that when the only evidence is circumstantial "the evidence
supporting a conviction must preclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence."
Layman, 953 P.2d at 786. Here an equally reasonable hypothesis is that Cardona-Gueton
6

Cardona-Gueton5 s alleged admission that the bike was his qualifies only as
circumstantial evidence as to whether he owned or knew of the drugs. See Layman, 953
P.2d at 789 n.6 (distinguishing between testimony that serves as direct evidence of an
element of a crime and testimony that serves as direct evidence that "goes to the
establishment of circumstantial evidence").
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arrived at the corner of 400 South 300 West and found, purchased, or even stole the
bicycle while unaware of its hidden contents. It's reasonable that once the officers found
and directed Cardona-Gueton's attention to a hidden compartment within the bicycle, he
did not want to be associated with what might be discovered in the hidden compartment of
the found/purchased/stolen bicycle.
Lastly, even assuming Cardona-Gueton knew drugs were within the bicycle, the
State presented no reliable evidence establishing that he had any intent to use them as his
own. Officers provided no fingerprint evidence; no evidence of current drug use, and no
evidence of past drug use. Furthermore, although Cardona-Gueton had $166 on his
person, he did not have any drugs or drug paraphernalia on him. As Cardona-Gueton
testified, the $166 was from a recently-cashed check he received from Social Security's
Supplemental Security Income program. R. 175:124.7
To summarize, based on the totality of the circumstances presented, there is
insufficient evidence to establish Cardona-Gueton constructively possessed the crack
cocaine. The State did not present evidence sufficient to show that Cardona-Gueton
knowingly and intentionally exercised dominion and control over the crack cocaine.
Because possession was not established, he cannot be found guilty of Possession of a
Controlled Substance with Intent to Distribute.

7

There was no evidence presented as to the amount of cash typically found on drug
dealers, and no evidence presented regarding the street value of the drugs seized.
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CONCLUSION
Cardona-Gueton requests that this Court reverse and remand the case for a new
trial or, alternatively, reverse the drug-free zone penalty enhancement conviction and
order that Cardona-Gueton be sentenced accordingly.
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1. POSS W/ INTENT TO DIST C/SUBSTANCE - 1st Degree Felony
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 09/07/2010 Guilty
SENTENCE PRISON
r

Based on the defendant's conviction of POSS W/ INTENT~TO~DIST
C/SUBSTANCE a 1st Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an
indeterminate term of not less than five years and which may be
life in the Utah State Prison.

To the SALT LAKE County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your
custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison where the
defendant will be confined.
SENTENCE RECOMMENDATION NOTE
Court recommends 450 days credit for time served.
Attorney Fees
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U.C.A. 1953 § 58-37-8
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness
Title 58. Occupations and Professions
NiChapter37. Utah Controlled Substances Act (Refs & Annos)
*§ 58-37-8. Prohibited acts-Penalties
(1) Prohibited acts A-Penalties:
(a) Except as authorized by this chapter, it is unlawful for any person to knowingly and
intentionally:
(i) produce, manufacture, or dispense, or to possess with intent to produce, manufacture,
or dispense, a controlled or counterfeit substance;
(ii) distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance, or to agree, consent, offer, or arrange
to distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance;
(iii) possess a controlled or counterfeit substance with intent to distribute; or
(iv) engage in a continuing criminal enterprise where:
(A) the person participates, directs, or engages in conduct which results in any violation
of any provision of Title 58, Chapters 37, 37a, 37b, 37c, or 37d that is a felony; and
(B) the violation is a part of a continuing series of two or more violations of Title 58,
Chapters 37, 37a, 37b, 37c, or 37d on separate occasions that are undertaken in concert
with five or more persons with respect to whom the person occupies a position of
organizer, supervisor, or any other position of management.
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (l)(a) with respect to:
(i) a substance or a counterfeit of a substance classified in Schedule I or II, a controlled
substance analog, or gammahydroxybutyric acid as listed in Schedule III is guilty of a
second degree felony and upon a second or subsequent conviction is guilty of a first
degree felony;
(ii) a substance or a counterfeit of a substance classified in Schedule III or IV, or
marijuana, or a substance listed in Section 58-37-4.2 is guilty of a third degree felony,
and upon a second or subsequent conviction is guilty of a second degree felony; or
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(iii) a substance or a counterfeit of a substance classified in Schedule V is guilty of a
class A misdemeanor and upon a second or subsequent conviction is guilty of a third
degree felony.
(c) Any person who has been convicted of a violation of Subsection (l)(a)(ii) or (iii) may
be sentenced to imprisonment for an indeterminate term as provided by law, but if the
trier of fact finds a firearm as defined in Section 76-10-501 was used, carried, or
possessed on his person or in his immediate possession during the commission or in
furtherance of the offense, the court shall additionally sentence the person convicted for a
term of one year to run consecutively and not concurrently; and the court may
additionally sentence the person convicted for an indeterminate term not to exceed five
years to run consecutively and not concurrently.
(d) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (l)(a)(iv) is guilty of a first degree
felony punishable by imprisonment for an indeterminate term of not less than seven years
and which may be for life. Imposition or execution of the sentence may not be suspended,
and the person is not eligible for probation.
(2) Prohibited acts B-Penalties:
(a) It is unlawful:
(i) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess or use a controlled substance
analog or a controlled substance, unless it was obtained under a valid prescription or
order, directly from a practitioner while acting in the course of the person's professional
practice, or as otherwise authorized by this chapter;
(ii) for any owner, tenant, licensee, or person in control of any building, room, tenement,
vehicle, boat, aircraft, or other place knowingly and intentionally to permit them to be
occupied by persons unlawfully possessing, using, or distributing controlled substances in
any of those locations; or
(iii) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess an altered or forged
prescription or written order for a controlled substance.
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(a)(i) with respect to:
(i) marijuana, if the amount is 100 pounds or more, is guilty of a second degree felony;
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule I or II, marijuana, if the amount is more than 16
ounces, but less than 100 pounds, or a controlled substance analog, is guilty of a third
degree felony; or
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(iii) marijuana, if the marijuana is not in the form of an extracted resin from any part of
the plant, and the amount is more than one ounce but less than 16 ounces, is guilty of a
class A misdemeanor.
(c) Upon a person's conviction of a violation of this Subsection (2) subsequent to a
conviction under Subsection (l)(a), that person shall be sentenced to a one degree greater
penalty than provided in this Subsection (2).
(d) Any person who violates Subsection (2)(a)(i) with respect to all other controlled
substances not included in Subsection (2)(b)(i), (ii), or (iii), including a substance listed
in Section 58-37-4.2, or less than one ounce of marijuana, is guilty of a class B
misdemeanor. Upon a second conviction the person is guilty of a class A misdemeanor,
and upon a third or subsequent conviction the person is guilty of a third degree felony.
(e) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(a)(i) while inside the exterior
boundaries of property occupied by any correctional facility as defined in Section 64-13I or any public jail or other place of confinement shall be sentenced to a penalty one
degree greater than provided in Subsection (2)(b), and if the conviction is with respect to
controlled substances as listed in:
(i) Subsection (2)(b), the person may be sentenced to imprisonment for an indeterminate
term as provided by law, and:
(A) the court shall additionally sentence the person convicted to a term of one year to run
consecutively and not concurrently; and
(B) the court may additionally sentence the person convicted for an indeterminate term
not to exceed five years to run consecutively and not concurrently; and
(ii) Subsection (2)(d), the person may be sentenced to imprisonment for an indeterminate
term as provided by law, and the court shall additionally sentence the person convicted to
a term of six months to run consecutively and not concurrently.
(f) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(a)(ii) or (iii) is:
(i) on afirstconviction, guilty of a class B misdemeanor;
(ii) on a second conviction, guilty of a class A misdemeanor; and
(iii) on a third or subsequent conviction, guilty of a third degree felony.
(g) A person is subject to the penalties under Subsection (2)(h) who, in an offense not
amounting to a violation of Section 76-5-207:
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(i) violates Subsection (2)(a)(i) by knowingly and intentionally having in the persons
body any measurable amount of a controlled substance; and
(ii) operates a motor vehicle as defined in Section 76-5-207 in a negligent manner,
causing serious bodily injury as defined in Section 76-1-601 or the death of another.
(h) A person who violates Subsection (2)(g) by having in the person's body:
(i) a controlled substance classified under Schedule I, other than those described in
Subsection (2)(h)(ii), or a controlled substance classified under Schedule II is guilty of a
second degree felony;
(ii) marijuana, tetrahydrocannabinols, or equivalents described in Subsection 58-37-4
(2)(a)(iii)(S) or (AA), or a substance listed in Section 58-37-4.2 is guilty of a third degree
felony; or
(iii) any controlled substance classified under Schedules III, IV, or V is guilty of a class
A misdemeanor.
(i) A person is guilty of a separate offense for each victim suffering serious bodily injury
or death as a result of the person's negligent driving in violation of Subsection 58-37-8
(2)(g) whether or not the injuries arise from the same episode of driving.
(3) Prohibited acts C-Penalties:
(a) It is unlawful for any person knowingly and intentionally:
(i) to use in the course of the manufacture or distribution of a controlled substance a
license number which is fictitious, revoked, suspended, or issued to another person or, for
the purpose of obtaining a controlled substance, to assume the title of, or represent
oneself to be, a manufacturer, wholesaler, apothecary, physician, dentist, veterinarian, or
other authorized person;
(ii) to acquire or obtain possession of, to procure or attempt to procure the administration
of, to obtain a prescription for, to prescribe or dispense to any person known to be
attempting to acquire or obtain possession of, or to procure the administration of any
controlled substance by misrepresentation or failure by the person to disclose receiving
any controlled substance from another source, fraud, forgery, deception, subterfuge,
alteration of a prescription or written order for a controlled substance, or the use of a false
name or address;
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(iii) to make any false or forged prescription or written order for a controlled substance,
or to utter the same, or to alter any prescription or written order issued or written under
the terms of this chapter; or
(iv) to make, distribute, or possess any punch, die, plate, stone, or other thing designed to
print, imprint, or reproduce the trademark, trade name, or other identifying mark, imprint,
or device of another or any likeness of any of the foregoing upon any drug or container or
labeling so as to render any drug a counterfeit controlled substance.
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (3)(a) is guilty of a third degree felony.
(4) Prohibited acts D-Penalties:
(a) Notwithstanding other provisions of this section, a person not authorized under this
chapter who commits any act declared to be unlawful under this section, Title 58, Chapter
37a, Utah Drug Paraphernalia Act, or under Title 58, Chapter 37b, Imitation Controlled
Substances Act, is upon conviction subject to the penalties and classifications under this
Subsection (4) if the trier of fact finds the act is committed:
(i) in a public or private elementary or secondary school or on the grounds of any of those
schools;
(ii) in a public or private vocational school or postsecondary institution or on the grounds
of any of those schools or institutions;
(iii) in those portions of any building, park, stadium, or other structure or grounds which
are, at the time of the act, being used for an activity sponsored by or through a school or
institution under Subsections (4)(a)(i) and (ii);
(iv) in or on the grounds of a preschool or child-care facility;
(v) in a public park, amusement park, arcade, or recreation center;
(vi) in or on the grounds of a house of worship as defined in Section 76-10-501;
(vii) in a shopping mall, sports facility, stadium, arena, theater, movie house, playhouse,
or parking lot or structure adjacent thereto;
(viii) in or on the grounds of a library;
(ix) within any area that is within 1,000 feet of any structure, facility, or grounds included
in Subsections (4)(a)(i), (ii), (iv), (vi), and (vii);
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(x) in the presence of a person younger than 18 years of age, regardless of where the act
occurs; or
(xi) for the purpose of facilitating, arranging, or causing the transport, delivery, or
distribution of a substance in violation of this section to an inmate or on the grounds of
any correctional facility as defined in Section 76-8-311.3.
(b)(i) A person convicted under this Subsection (4) is guilty of a first degree felony and
shall be imprisoned for a term of not less than five years if the penalty that would
otherwise have been established but for this Subsection (4) would have been a first
degree felony.
(ii) Imposition or execution of the sentence may not be suspended, and the person is not
eligible for probation.
(c) If the classification that would otherwise have been established would have been less
than a first degree felony but for this Subsection (4), a person convicted under this
Subsection (4) is guilty of one degree more than the maximum penalty prescribed for that
offense. This Subsection (4)(c) does not apply to a violation of Subsection (2)(g).
(d)(i) If the violation is of Subsection (4)(a)(xi):
(A) the person may be sentenced to imprisonment for an indeterminate term as provided
by law, and the court shall additionally sentence the person convicted for a term of one
year to run consecutively and not concurrently; and
(B) the court may additionally sentence the person convicted for an indeterminate term
not to exceed five years to run consecutively and not concurrently; and
(ii) the penalties under this Subsection (4)(d) apply also to any person who, acting with
the mental state required for the commission of an offense, directly or indirectly solicits,
requests, commands, coerces, encourages, or intentionally aids another person to commit
a violation of Subsection (4)(a)(xi).
(e) It is not a defense to a prosecution under this Subsection (4) that the actor mistakenly
believed the individual to be 18 years of age or older at the time of the offense or was
unaware of the individual's true age; nor that the actor mistakenly believed that the
location where the act occurred was not as described in Subsection (4)(a) or was unaware
that the location where the act occurred was as described in Subsection (4)(a).
(5) Any violation of this chapter for which no penalty is specified is a class B
misdemeanor.
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(6) For purposes of penalty enhancement under Subsections (l)(b) and (2)(c), a plea of
guilty or no contest to a violation of this section which is held in abeyance under Title 77,
Chapter 2a, Pleas in Abeyance, is the equivalent of a conviction, even if the charge has
been subsequently reduced or dismissed in accordance with the plea in abeyance
agreement.
(7) A person may be charged and sentenced for a violation of this section,
notwithstanding a charge and sentence for a violation of any other section of this chapter.
(8)(a) Any penalty imposed for violation of this section is in addition to, and not in lieu
of, any civil or administrative penalty or sanction authorized by law.
(b) Where violation of this chapter violates a federal law or the law of another state,
conviction or acquittal under federal law or the law of another state for the same act is a
bar to prosecution in this state.
(9) In any prosecution for a violation of this chapter, evidence or proof which shows a
person or persons produced, manufactured, possessed, distributed, or dispensed a
controlled substance or substances, is prima facie evidence that the person or persons did
so with knowledge of the character of the substance or substances.
(10) This section does not prohibit a veterinarian, in good faith and in the course of the
veterinarian's professional practice only and not for humans, from prescribing,
dispensing, or administering controlled substances or from causing the substances to be
administered by an assistant or orderly under the veterinarian's direction and supervision.
(11) Civil or criminal liability may not be imposed under this section on:
(a) any person registered under this chapter who manufactures, distributes, or possesses
an imitation controlled substance for use as a placebo or investigational new drug by a
registered practitioner in the ordinary course of professional practice or research; or
(b) any law enforcement officer acting in the course and legitimate scope of the officer's
employment.
(12)(a) Civil or criminal liability may not be imposed under this section on any Indian, as
defined in Subsection 58-37-2(l)(v), who uses, possesses, or transports peyote for bona
fide traditional ceremonial purposes in connection with the practice of a traditional Indian
religion as defined in Subsection 58-37-2(l)(w).
(b) In a prosecution alleging violation of this section regarding peyote as defined in
Subsection 58-37-4(2)(a)(iii)(V), it is an affirmative defense that the peyote was used,
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possessed, or transported by an Indian for bona fide traditional ceremonial purposes in
connection with the practice of a traditional Indian religion.
(c)(i) The defendant shall provide written notice of intent to claim an affirmative defense
under this Subsection (12) as soon as practicable, but not later than 10 days prior to trial.
(ii) The notice shall include the specific claims of the affirmative defense.
(iii) The court may waive the notice requirement in the interest of justice for good cause
shown, if the prosecutor is not unfairly prejudiced by the lack of timely notice.
(d) The defendant shall establish the affirmative defense under this Subsection (12) by a
preponderance of the evidence. If the defense is established, it is a complete defense to
the charges.
(13)(a) It is an affirmative defense that the person produced, possessed, or administered a
controlled substance listed in Section 58-37-4.2 if the person:
(i) was engaged in medical research; and
(ii) was a holder of a valid license to possess controlled substances under Section 58-376.
(b) It is not a defense under Subsection (13)(a) that the person prescribed or dispensed a
controlled substance listed in Section 58-37-4.2.
(14) It is an affirmative defense that the person possessed, in the person's body, a
controlled substance listed in Section 58-37-4.2 if:
(a) the person was the subject of medical research conducted by a holder of a valid
license to possess controlled substances under Section 58-37-6; and
(b) the substance was administered to the person by the medical researcher.
(15) If any provision of this chapter, or the application of any provision to any person or
circumstances, is held invalid, the remainder of this chapter shall be given effect without
the invalid provision or application.
(16) A legislative body of a political subdivision may not enact an ordinance that is less
restrictive than any provision of this chapter.
CREDIT(S)
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Laws 1971, c. 145, § 8; Laws 1972, c. 22, § 1; Laws 1977, c. 29, § 6; Laws 1979, c. 12, §
5; Laws 1985, c. 146, § 1; Laws 1986, c. 196, § 1; Laws 1987, c. 92, § 100; Laws 1987,
c. 190, § 3; Laws 1988, c. 95, § 1; Laws 1989, c. 50, § 2; Laws 1989, c. 56, § 1; Laws
1989, c. 178, § 1; Laws 1989, c. 187, § 2; Laws 1989, c. 201, § 1: Laws 1990. c. 161.3 1:
Laws 1990. c. 163. §3 2. 3: Laws 1991. c. 80. 3 1: Laws 1991. c. 198. § 4: Laws 1991. c.
268. § 7: Laws 1995. c. 284. § 1. eff. May 1. 1995: Laws 1996. c. 1. $ 8. eff. Jan. 31.
1996: Laws 1997. c. 64. 3 6. eff. May 5. 1997: Laws 1998. c. 139. 3 1. eff. May 4. 1998:
Laws 1999. c. 12. § 1. eff. May 3. 1999: Laws 1999. c. 303. 3 1. eff. May 3.1999: Laws
2003. c. 10. § 1. eff. May 5.2003: Laws 2003. c. 33. § 6. eff. May 5. 2003: Laws 2004. c.
36. § 1. eff. March 15. 2004: Laws 2005. c. 30. § 1. eff. May 2.2005: Laws 2006. c. 8, §
4. eff. May 1.2006: Laws 2006. c. 30. § 1. eff. May 1. 2006: Laws 2007. c. 374. $ 1. eff.
April 30. 2007: Laws 2008. c. 295. U . eff. May 5. 2008: Laws 2009. c. 214. § 3. eff.
May 12. 2009: Laws 2010. c. 64. § 2. eff. March 22. 2010: Laws 2011. c. 12. S 8. eff.
Feb. 25.2011.
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LOHRA L. MILLER
District Attorney for Salt Lake County
CRAIG STANGER, Bar No. 11772
Deputy District Attorney
111 East Broadway, Suite #400
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: (801)363-7900

W^8£

1NAL

Tmrd Jud/c/al D/s^cV
By

SALT LAKE CQfc

IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH
Assigned to: CRAIG STANGER
THE STATE OF UTAH
DAO# 09039165
Plaintiff,
vs.
ROLANDO CARDONA-GUETON
DOB: 07/17/1950,
AKA: NONE
155 S 400 E # 14
SALT LAKE CITY, UT
OTN 33639568
SO# 0317697
Defendant.

AMENDED
INFORMATION
Case No. 091908492

The undersigned Deputy District Attorney upon a written affidavit states on information
and belief that the defendant, ROLANDO CARDONA-GUETON, committed the crime of:
COUNT 1
POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE WITH INTENT TO DISTRIBUTE (DFZ),
2845 58-37-8(l)(a)(iii) UCA, first degree felony, as follows: That on or about October 22, 2009
at 400 South 300 West, in Salt Lake County, State of Utah the defendant did knowingly and
intentionally possess a controlled or counterfeit substance with intent to distribute, to wit [specify
a Schedule I or II substance or controlled substance analog], and committed the offense
(i) in a public or private elementary or secondary school or on the grounds of any of those
schools;
(ii) in a public or private vocational school or postsecondary institution or on the grounds of any
of those schools or institutions;
(iii) in those portions of any building, park, stadium, or other structure or grounds which are, at
the time of the act, being used for an activity sponsored by or through a school or institution
under Subsections (4)(a)(i) and (ii);
(iv) in or on the grounds of a preschool or child-care facility;
(v) in a public park, amusement park, arcade, or recreation center;
(vi) in or on the grounds of a house of worship as defined in Section 76-10-501;
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(vii) in a shopping mall, sports facility, stadium, arena, theater, movie house, playhouse, or
parking lot or structure adjacent thereto;
(viii) in or on the grounds of a library;
(ix) within any area that is within 1,000 feet of any structure, facility, or grounds included in
Subsections (4)(a)(i), (ii), (iv), (vi), and (vii);
(x) in the presence of a person younger than 18 years of age, regardless of where the act occurs;
or
(xi) for the purpose of facilitating, arranging, or causing the transport, delivery, or distribution of
a substance in violation of this section to an inmate or on the grounds of any correctional facility
as defined in Section 76-8-311.3.
THIS INFORMATION IS BASED ON EVIDENCE OBTAINED FROM THE FOLLOWING
WITNESSES:
MICHAEL CARD WELL, TREASA CHOPP, STATE CRIME LAB, KRISTOPHER
JEPPSEN, AMMON MAUGA, FRANK WERNER, LYNN WRIGHT
AFFIDAVIT OF PROBABLE CAUSE:
Your affiant bases the Information upon the following:
The statement of Salt Lake City Police Officer K. Jeppsen that on October 22, 2009,
while on routine bike patrol in the area of 400 South 300 West, Salt Lake County, he observed
what a appeared to be a possible drug transaction. Officer Jeppsen made contact with defendant
ROLANDO CARDONA-GUETON who was in possession of 14 rocks of field-tested-positive
cocaine.
Pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 46-5-101
(2007) I declare under criminal penalty of the State
of Utah that the foregoing is true and correct to the
best of my belief and knowledge.
Executed on:

Authorized for presentment and filing
LOHRA L. MyXER^istrict Attorney
t)eputy District Attorney
22nd day df February, 2010
DM/GG/DAO# 09039165
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